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Utilizing Economic Ties with China: Brazilian Economic Development Policy in the Age of 
Bolsonaro 
By Aotian Zheng 
 
1. Introduction 
On October 24, 2019, Brazilian President Bolsonaro made his first official visit to China 
since the start of his presidency. During his speech at the Brazil-Chinese Economic and Trade 
Cooperation Forum, Bolsonaro claimed that China and Brazil "were born to walk together," 
stating that the two governments are "completely aligned in a way that reaches beyond our 
commercial and business relationship" (Bloomberg, 2019). Considering Bolsonaro’s past as a 
right-wing politician who openly identifies himself with U.S. President Donald Trump, his 
transformation from radical basher of the Chinese economic presence in Brazil to an advocate 
of the Sino-Brazilian economic relationship is significant. Not only does it demonstrate 
Bolsonaro’s pragmatism, but it also represents the deep economic tie between China and 
Brazil, who are incidentally two of the largest economies in the world.  
 Back in 2018, Bolsanaro’s possible victory created a wide-spread panic amongst 
Chinese investors in Brazil. Fearing the policy shift caused by a right-wing victory in the 
Brazilian Presidential election, Chinese investments in Brazil dropped 75.5% in 2018 
(MACAUHUB, 2019). As a politician who is famous for criticizing Chinese investment in 
Brazil, Bolsonaro strictly criticized China’s deep involvement in Brazil’s mining sectors, 
claiming this a predatory practice（Lapper,2019） based on an unbalanced trade 
relationship in which Brazil only served as the provider of a natural resource for the booming 
Chinese economy (Lapper, 2019). However, much to the surprise of the Chinese, after his 
victory, Bolsonaro demonstrated friendly gestures toward Chinese investment. His visit to 
China on October 25, 2019, showed that despite his discontent on the unbalanced trade 
relationship between China and Brazil during the election, Bolsonaro recognized the 
importance of the China-Brazilian relationship to Brazilian society. However, it may not be 
enough to mend the skepticism of Chinese investors. Despite signing multiple deals on 
infrastructure development and agricultural trade with Chinese companies, Bolsonaro did not 
achieve any significant agreements on economic and technological cooperation with China, 
as some optimistic observers had predicted (Ribeiro, 2019). 
Bolsonaro’s showing of goodwill to Chinese investment has raised suspicion and 
discontent from the United States, as some media claims Bolsonaro failed to fulfill his 
political promise during the election and fell under the Chinese economic influences (Brain, 
2019). In the context of the trade dispute between China and the United States in 2019, the 
United States’ suspicion of Bolsonaro’s visit in China could ultimately damage Bolsonaro’s 
effort to improve the US-Brazilian relations.  
Currently, Bolsonaro's government is focusing on boosting Brazil's economic 
development. A healthy economic relationship with China will significantly contribute to 
Brazil's goal of economic development. However, the complexity of this bilateral relationship 
also require Brazilian government to act with prudence. To address this policy question, the 
objective of this paper is to provide a policy recommendation for the current Brazilian 
government on adjusting their economic relationship with China. This paper will identify the 
significant policy dilemma that the current Brazilian government is facing on achieving 
economic development and managing the economic relations with China in the field of 
investment, technological innovation, and trade. This study will then evaluate the policy 
alternatives for the Brazilian government and construct a series of viable policy 
recommendations. The purpose of the policy recommendation is to help Brazil utilize 
investment and trade relationships with China not only to resolve the current economic 
 
challenge Brazil but also to cultivate the competitiveness of Brazilian enterprise that serves 
Brazil's long-term economic development.   
 
2. Literature Review 
The Sino-Brazil partnership occupies a unique position among the partnerships China has 
developed in Latin America. Driven both by China's rapid economic growth and the political 
support of the left-wing government of Brazil, China's economic and political ties with Brazil 
have been greatly strengthened in the last two decades.  
Brazil established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in 1974. 
However, the Sino-Brazilian relationship only started to deepen as Brazil began the process 
of political liberalization under the leadership of Joao Figueiredo in the 1980s. In 1993, China 
and Brazil recognized each other as "strategic partners," which made Brazil the first Latin 
American country to receive this designation from the Chinese government. In the following 
years, this relationship was deepened through the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
(1995-2003), Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2011) and Dilma Vana Rousseff (2011-2016) 
(De Oliveira 2010). In 2015, during Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jia Bao’s official visit to 
Brazil, the Chinese and Brazilian governments signed a new joint declaration to enhance their 
relationship to the level of "Global Strategic partnership," which further emphasized the 
unique relationship between China and Brazil in Latin America (Zhou, 2019). 
Accompanying the development of political relations is the strengthening of economic 
ties between China and Brazil. Both China and Brazil are considered as two of the most 
important emerging economies in the globe by many international observers(Neil,2001). 
After the economic crisis of 2008, motivated by both fast recovering Chinese economy and 
left-leaning foreign Policy of President Lula, China became Brazil's largest single trade and 
investment partner in 2009. By the end of 2017, China served as both the largest import 
origin and export destination for Brazil, providing Brazil about $21 billion of trade surplus 
with China (OEC，2018). The abundant mining resources of Brazil, as well as the massive 
soybean production of the country, made it one of China's most valuable trade partners 
(OEC,2018). Brazil's natural resources, especially oil, rare metals, and soybeans, gradually 
became an essential part of Chinese industrial development. Consequently, this made 
maintaining the bilateral relationship between China and Brazil also start to gain higher 
priority in the Chinese policy-making circle (Elmer, 2019). 
However, despite its fast development, the Sino-Brazilian Relationship has faced 
significant struggles in the last several decades. In the field of international politics, despite 
being a long-term supporter of Latin America's political and economic autonomy, the 
Chinese government did not provide substantive support on Brazil's pursuit of a permanent 
seat on the United Nations Security Council (Zhou, 2019). In the economic realm, the trade 
of raw materials is still the predominant trade between China and Brazil, contributing little to 
Brazil's industrial upgrading in the global supply chains. Trade with China has not only 
strengthened Brazil's role in the global economy as a raw material supplier but also in 
generating potential environmental and social risk. In the meantime, the foreign direct 
investment (FDI) from China is still experiencing relatively slow growth due to Brazil's 
protectionist policy on foreign investment. 
President Bolsonaro’s critique of Chinese investment, which contributed to his victory 
during the election, further emphasized the struggle of Sino-Brazilian economic relations. 
During his campaign, Bolsonaro strictly criticized the Chinese investment in Brazil's mining 
industry, especially the niobium industry (Lapper, 2019), calling it a threat to Brazil's 
economic sovereignty. Bolsonaro's criticism of Chinese investment generated a considerable 
amount of support from the Brazilian voters, which partly reflected Brazil’s public opinion on 
 
Chinese economic presence in their country. In this situation, moving the unbalanced 
economic relationship with China toward a more sustainable and mutually beneficial 
direction should be the focus of current government policy. 
China's economic and political presence in Brazil has become an essential topic of 
international relations since the dawn of the twentieth century, especially among scholars in 
Latin America. The research on the contemporary Sino-Brazilian economic relationship 
focuses on three different topics: 1. The impact of Chinese direct investment and 
manufacturing export on Brazil's economy; 2. The natural resource exportation model 
between China and Brazil; 3. The geopolitical implications of the Sino-Brazilian relationship, 
particularly regarding the potential conflict with the interests of the United States. 
Regarding the Chinese exportation to Brazil, the researchers’ opinions are divided. Some 
researchers argue that the current relationship between Brazil and China is highly imbalanced 
and strongly favors China over Brazil (Pereira, Neves,2011). The authors argue China has 
more effectively utilized the natural resources from Brazil for domestic industrial and 
economic development, meanwhile, Brazil lacks the institutions and productive economic 
environment to utilize Chinese capital for infrastructure and research and development. 
Jenkins concluded that the economic rise of China greatly favors Brazil's mining and 
agricultural sector, effectively damaging the global competitiveness of Brazil's manufacturing 
sector (Jenkin, 2012). Some researchers also observed that the Chinese enterprises in Latin 
America are putting considerable effort into diversifying their exports in Latin America, 
which sometimes creates more significant threats than it does benefits to the manufacturing 
enterprise in the region (Shambaugh, Murphy, 2012). However, some scholars demonstrated 
a positive or neutral attitude toward Chinese exports in Brazil. Santiso (2006) argues that 
China's trade impact in Latin America can have a positive effect on the Latin American 
economy by encouraging Latin American countries, including Brazil, to adopt more 
progressive economic and financial reforms to utilize in Latin America's comparative 
advantages in the global supply chain. Similarly, Jenkins and Freitas (2016) argue that the 
negative effect of increasing Chinese exports on Brazil’s industry has been exaggerated as it 
does not pose high competition against Brazilian enterprise in Brazil’s domestic market. 
Jenkins and Freitas encourage the Brazilian government to seek more technology transfer in 
trade with Chinese companies and help them to manufacture their products locally.  
In terms of the Chinese direct investment in Latin America, Avendano, Melguizo, and 
Miner (2017) observed that despite the fact that the mining and financial industry still 
received the majority of Chinese investment, the Chinese investment within the service 
industry and renewable energy sectors is experiencing the fastest growth in Brazil.1 In the 
meantime, Chen (2014) also argues that Chinese companies are still learning how to operate 
in Brazil’s economic environment in the midst of complex and protectionist investment 
policies that can often lead to the delay and cancellation of investment projects. Veiga and 
Rios (2019) observed that Chinese investors are increasingly interested in the R&D sectors in 
Brazil, including research centers, universities, and manufacturing industries. However, 
despite recovering from the shocking decrease in 2018, Chinese investors are still suffering 
from a lack of access to R&D sectors and Brazil’s complex taxation policy. 
Concerning the resource-driven trade between China and Brazil, many scholars have 
focused on the correlating environmental cost. Ray, Gallagher, Lopez, and Sanborn analyzed 
the environment and social impact of resource-driven Chinese investment in Latin America 
(2015). The research recommends that both the Latin American government and Chinese 
 
 
 
 
international firms implement better social and environmental regulation over the operation 
of Chinese companies in Latin America. This is intended to include the establishment of 
independent monitoring on ecological impact, better cooperation with local civil society, and 
the creation of a more transparent policy-making process (Ray, Gallagher, Lopez, Sanborn, 
2015).  
After studying the operation of a Chinese nationally owned oil company in Brazil, Deng 
(2010) argues that the resource-driven trade between China and Brazil is typically 
monopolized by Chinese companies. As a result, the profit from selling natural resources is 
highly immobile in Brazil’s economic system and cannot be used efficiently to benefit 
economic development in the other sectors. Meanwhile, Gallas (2012) argues that despite the 
contributions of Chinese investment to the economic recovery of Brazil after the economic 
crisis, it did not support the industrial upgrade of Brazil since it did not provide significant 
technological transfers that would benefit Brazil’s R&D growth.   
 In terms of the geopolitical implications of the Sino-Brazilian relationship, most 
researchers viewed the United States as the other major player in the region. Henrique 
Altemani de Oliveira is one of the first Brazilian scholars who published comprehensive 
research on the Sino-Brazilian relationship from the geopolitical perspective. In his article: 
Brazil-China: Thirty years of a strategic partnership (2004), Oliveria provided a historical 
review on the relationship between China and Brazil since the 19th century. In this paper, 
Oliveira argues that the cooperation between China and Brazil is not only based on economic 
need but also rooted in the shared quest of reaching for a higher international status between 
the two countries. However, he views the economic and political presence of the United 
States as the major obstacle for the expansion of Chinese economic influence in Brazil and 
Latin America. This argument was re-visited by Ellis (2009), as the author argues the Chinese 
government is mainly focusing on the expansion of trade and investment in Latin America 
while avoiding conflict with the United States in the region. 
In 2012, Oliveira published Brazil and China: South-South cooperation and strategic 
partnership. In this research, Oliveira stressed the strategic potential of the improved 
relationship between China and Brazil in the last decade under the South-South Cooperation 
framework. However, he demonstrated doubt on the viability of the political and economic 
objective set by China and Lula's government within the joint governmental statement due to 
the division of policy focus between two countries. 
Some scholars also addressed the Chinese presence in Latin America as a positive force 
in the geopolitical landscape. In José-Augusto Guilhon-Albuquerque’s article Brazil, China, 
US: a triangular relation? (2014)The author argues that Brazil can play an active role in 
cultivating a positive common agenda on trade and economic development with China and 
the United States in Latin America. Ellis (2009) also made a similar argument as he believes 
despite their competition, Brazil, China, and United States are moving toward a more 
constructive relationship that will benefit the future development of Latin America. 
 
3. Constructing Criteria 
    The current economic struggle of Brazil is deeply related to the developmental policy 
adopted by the worker party administration headed by Lula and later Rousseff. After the 
failure of ISI policy in the 1980s and the unsuccessful privatization policy in the 1990s, 
President Lula was elected based on his political promise for improving the living standard of 
lower-income populations and stabilizing Brazil's fragile economy. During Lula's 
administration, the Brazilian economic policy was centered on robust financial regulation 
stabilization, strengthening domestic markets, promoting social welfare, and mineral and 
agricultural exports (Arestis, Paula, Filho, 2007). 
 
The result of Lula’s economic reformation was primarily viewed as a success during his 
administration. Under the influence of comparative advantage theory, Lula’s administration 
strongly supported the development of the Brazilian agricultural sector, which enabled Brazil 
to become “the breadbasket of the world," as he described during an interview in the 
European Parliament (European Parliament External Relations, 2007). By 2018, Brazil had 
become the largest exporter of beef and sugar and the second-largest soybean exporter in the 
world, largely thanks to the high demand from China (Datamarnews, 2019). The trade surplus 
Brazil received through exporting mineral and agricultural products helped Lula to 
consolidate enough resources to support his massive social welfare programs, such as Bolsa 
Familia, aimed at improving the living quality and education for the lower-income 
populations (Tepperman, 2016). From 2003 to 2010, the Brazilian middle class grew from 
37% to 50% of the total population, while the median of Brazilian household income raised 
37% (Lyons, Prada 2010). To put the Brazilian inflation in control, the Lula administration 
also adopted strict inflation targeting monetary policy, which created a more stable internal 
market in Brazil.  
However, despite its early success, Lula’s Policy eventually led to many economic 
problems that fully emerged during the presidency of his predecessor, Rousseff. First of all, 
as the foundation of Lula’s economic policy, Brazil’s booming agricultural and mineral 
exports eventually worsened the Brazilian economic environment for the manufacturing 
sector and further reinforced Brazil’s role as the importer of high-value goods and exporter 
for low-value goods (Kliass, 2011). The high-interest rate in Brazil also caused a great 
appreciation of Brazil's currency, which worsened the deindustrialization process of Brazil. It 
also created the high dependence of Brazil's economy on the international price of the 
commodity, which significantly contributed to Brazil’s economic crisis in 2016 (European 
Central Bank, 2016). 
Secondly, the massive welfare programs of the Lula administration eventually worsened 
the debt condition of the Brazilian government, and despite the impressive increase of the 
Brazilian middle class, the Lula administration failed to provide the social infrastructure, and 
stable job opportunities necessary to support it, leaving a generation of Brazilians extremely 
economically vulnerable and politically unstable (Anderson, 2019). These conditions spilled 
over to the Brazilian welfare program, which eventually became unsustainable. One of the 
examples of the fragile welfare system in Brazil is the program of Bolsa Familia: the largest 
social program initiated by the Lula administration. In the last 15 years, Bolsa Familia has 
significantly improved the health and education condition among the low-income population 
in Brazil by offering financial support to low-income families. However, primarily as a 
financial support program, Bolsa Familia fails to address more substantial causes for poverty 
and economic inequality, such as unemployment, lacking proper social infrastructure, and 
slow economic development in rural areas.  
Without creating more economic opportunities, Bolsa Familia encouraged the low-
income population’s economic dependency on government programs. During the economic 
recession from 2014 to 2016, the Bolsa Familia program has been proven unsustainable as it 
started to face severe funding problems, which led to an overall detrimental impact on the 
living condition of the lower-income families (Maranhao, 2020). As a result, the positive 
social impacts of Bolsa Familia on education and health started to dwindle as the economic 
gap in Brazil increased. (Concalves, Menicucci, Amaral, 2017) In this circumstance, despite 
early successes, welfare programs like Bolsa Familia eventually became unsustainable due to 
a lack of efficient economic programs and infrastructure development. 
Thirdly, the inflation targeting policy of Lula’s administration reduced the rate of foreign 
direct investment in Brazil and subsequently led to the reduction of capital productivity 
(Gaulard, 2015). The high interest and high tax rate gravely harmed the confidence of foreign 
 
investors and the Brazilian private sector. Lula government's tax policy eventually led to the 
reduction of job availability in the labor market and increased the vulnerability of the 
Brazilian middle class (Gaulard, 2015). 
Facing the current economic struggle of Brazil, the objective of the future Brazilian 
governmental policy on managing the economic relationship with China should be resolving 
the economic challenges above. To achieve this objective, there are three major policy 
criteria: 
A. The policy should efficiently address the current economic struggle that Brazil is 
facing.  
B. The policy should promote the long-term economic competitiveness of Brazil by 
benefiting Brazil’s industrial upgrade, infrastructural development, and technological 
development. 
C. Since Brazil has a very competitive democratic political system, the policy should 
have sufficient political viability, which means it needs to appeal to the voter base of the 
current administration while preserving Brazil’s economic sovereignty. 
 
4. Policy Options and Evaluation 
In order to find a policy solution for Brazil to best utilize its economic relationship with 
China to benefit its short term and long-term economic development, this paper investigated 
three policy options that are available to the current administration. 
The first policy option is the neo-liberalism option, which requires the current 
administration to allow the foreign capital to enter the sectors that previously monopolized by 
the Brazilian company. This includes the mineral sector, aviation industry, energy sector, and 
transportation sector (Squire Sanders, 2014). Brazil also needs to reduce barriers and 
regulations for foreign investors, including reducing taxation, actively deregulating labor, and 
allowing the Chinese capital to become shareholders of the nationally owned enterprise, 
especially the electricity sectors and mineral sectors. 
As a part of the current economic agenda of the Bolsonaro government, the liberalism 
approach is a quick way to resolve many short-term economic challenges that Brazil is 
currently facing. During his visit to China, Bolsonaro stated that he welcomed the Chinese 
company to join the bidding acquisition for the Petrobras, the largest state-owned petroleum 
cooperation in Brazil (Reuters, 2019). The entrance of Chinese capital can quickly allow the 
real interest rate to fall, which can significantly stimulate the Brazilian economy. It can also 
create an immediate cash inflow for the Brazilian government to reduce the debt pressure left 
by the previous government. Finally, the introduction of foreign capital, including Chinese 
capital, into the previously inefficiently managed and nationally owned enterprise can 
provide an opportunity for introducing a more efficient and profit-driven managerial method 
and even offer more access for technological transfer, which can help in increasing Brazil’s 
economic efficiency in the long term. 
However, the neo-liberalism approach can also lead to high political and economic risks 
for the current administration. First of all, the privatization will not fundamentally change the 
unbalanced economic relationship between China and Brazil. Instead, handing control of the 
national owned mineral and agricultural cooperation would only strengthen Brazil’s 
economic dependence on China. At the same time, the privatization of the nationally owned 
enterprise would not necessarily improve the condition of Brazil's economy based on the 
history of previous policy practice. In the 1990s, the Millo administration massively 
privatized the Brazilian energy sector, which led to a critical energy crisis from 1997 to 1999, 
due to mismanagement (Tankha, 2019). 
The massive scale and poor management of Brazilian national owned enterprises are not 
very attractive to foreign investors. In the example of privatization of the Brazilian energy 
 
sector in the 1990s, after the early investment rush from the international investors, the 
serious financial problems of the Brazilian electricity enterprise eventually become 
unattractive to foreign investors (Tankha, 2019). Currently, although many Chinese private 
companies have shown interest in investing in Brazil, there is no strong indication that 
Chinese companies are interested in purchasing Brazil’s nationally owned enterprises. 
Instead, Chinese companies are more interested in co-operating with Brazilian enterprises in 
Brazil (Leahy, Schipani, Hornby, 2017). In these circumstances, the neo-liberalism policy 
may not achieve the objective of reducing government debt as the policy designer expected. 
The risk for liberalism policy also resides in the political sector. A plan of selling 
Brazilian national owned enterprise to Chinese company are firmly contradicted to 
Bolsonaro’s nationalist political promise during his election on protecting Brazil’s economic 
sovereignty, which will be extremely harmful to the population support of current 
administration. More importantly, many Brazilian nationalized companies in the energy and 
transportation sectors are also tied to the conservative interest groups in Brazil, especially the 
military and former military personnel. A privatization plan will unavoidably damage their 
economic interest and their support to the current administration (Cardin, 2019). Finally, the 
cooperative restructuring caused by privatization can also cause an increase in the 
unemployment rate, which can politically destabilize Brazilian society. 
The second policy approach is the developmental approach, which is a continuation of 
Rousseff’s policy on stimulating Brazil's economy through large governmentally operated 
projects. The economic plan should include infrastructure development projects, government 
subsidy programs designed to improve the competitiveness of the Brazilian enterprises in the 
international markets, and rebuilding the domestic markets of Brazil. As a retreat from Lula's 
overspending of governmental resources, Rousseff first reduced the governmental support on 
the unrealistic oversea economic expansion project adopted by Lula, including the 
agricultural project of Brazilian development cooperation in Africa, in order to drive more 
resources back to Brazil’s domestic market (Marcondes, Mawdsley, 2017). She then started a 
massive governmental support program, including the expansion of the Brazilian National 
Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) and Initiative for the Integration of 
South American Regional Infrastructure (IIRI) to provide more opportunity for Brazilian 
infrastructure development and even trying to expand the project to other Latin American 
countries (Gwynn, 2017). Finally. Rousseff’s administration also adopted multiple nationally 
sponsored industrial development projects to further stimulate the national economy, 
represented by the “Plano Brasil Maior," which focuses on improving Brazil's capability of 
technological innovation and industrial productivity (Zanatta, 2011). 
Rousseff’s developmental framework provided an established system of economic 
development programs for the current administration. It also provides excellent cooperation 
opportunities under the international framework, such as the New Development Bank (NDB), 
established by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) states, which is an 
economic coalition established by the five largest emerging economy in the world. Through 
the massive infrastructure and industrial development projects, the current government can 
create a large number of jobs to reduce unemployment and stimulate the domestic economy 
effectively. 
The development of social infrastructure can effectively serve the Brazilian economic 
development in the long term. Under these circumstances, Brazil's deep economic ties with 
China can offer Brazil more access to Chinese capital and lending under the institutional 
structure of the New Development Bank (NDB) and Asian Infrastructure Development Bank 
(AIIB) with preferable conditions. As an example, contrary to World Bank, AIIB does not 
include privatization and deregulation as a part of loan conditionality, which addressed the 
concern of the Brazilian population on Brazil's economic sovereignty (Koh, 2015). Chinese 
 
companies can also provide technical support for Brazil’s infrastructure development 
projects. Finally, the industrial development project “Plano Brasil Maior” can also increase 
access to more diverse goods and services to the population, which can both boost Brazil's 
industrial development and increase the standard of living of the Brazilian population.  
The primary concern about this policy is its efficiency. First of all, the industrial 
development project “Plano Brasil Maior,” was intensely criticized for its protectionist 
practices, as it is highly reliant on the governmental purchases, its anti-dumping policy, and 
payroll tax exemption (Novais, 2011). In the context of Brazil, the protectionist policy can 
not only damage the rate of foreign direct investment from China but can also make Chinese 
enterprises less willing to commit to technological transfers. The protectionist nature of the 
developmental policy will make Brazilian enterprise unable to utilize its economic 
relationship with China for technological exchange, which is crucial for the industrial 
upgrade of Brazil. The Brazilian economy primarily utilizes its economic relationship with 
China through financial lending, which can further worsen the debt pressure of the Brazilian 
government.  
The developmental policy can also lead to more significant economic inefficiency and 
corruption due to the consolidation of the political and economic power of the government. 
Many Scholars have emphasized that government-led industrialization programs in Brazil are 
usually controlled by privileged groups within specific political or military circles (Candler, 
1996). The enterprises created by such a system are usually highly uncompetitive and deeply 
reliant on governmental subsidies and political corruption to survive. In this situation, the 
developmental policy approach will be unable to achieve acceptable economic efficiency 
without the support of a comprehensive political reformation on increasing governmental 
transparency and integrity, which may take longer than most economic reformation. 
The third policy option would be the bilateral trade-upgrade approach. This approach 
requires the Brazilian government to seek and reach a bilateral free trade agreement with 
China, as well as further encourage economic cooperation in the private sector between China 
and Brazil by establishing better investment policy and commercial environment. Compared 
to the previous two approaches, the trade-upgrade approach requires the least restructuring of 
Brazil’s established economic structure, which is less politically risky. However, it can also 
be argued that this approach ultimately avoids comprehensive economic reformation. 
Among the primary measures of trade-upgrade approach, the reduction or even 
elimination of tariffs played an essential role. Based on the research of the World Bank, by 
2014, both China and Brazil adopted relatively high tariffs from an international perspective. 
However, the World Bank research is arguable as both China and Brazil start to balance their 
economies, the increasing complementarity of the bilateral trade will encourage both 
countries to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers (The World Bank, 2014). This prediction 
came true in 2019, as the Chinese government declared that it would eliminate the tariff on 
sugar by 2020 (YNTW, 2019) and reduce the tax for airliners (China Briefing, 2019) while 
Brazil chose to reduce tariffs on Chinese manufacturing goods by 10% (Reuters, 2019). As 
both China and Brazil are actively reducing the trade barriers between them, it is evident that 
both countries are promoting the bilateral trade relationship between them beyond the trade 
of natural resources. 
Although the current complementarity of Sino-Brazilian trade is still highly based on the 
commodity trade, there is still considerable room for economic cooperation in more diverse 
sectors. As Rhys and Barbosa (2012) have argued, Chinese manufacturing products are not 
highly competitive against the Brazilian manufacturing sector, due to the high demand of the 
Brazilian domestic market and the different focus of the Chinese and Brazilian industries. 
Rhys further argued that the better industrial foundation of Brazil could help it catch the 
opportunity of the Chinese market during its transitional period and build an economic 
 
relationship with China different from other resource exporting countries. A recent example 
was the successful business expansion of Brazilian aerospace conglomerate (Embraer) in the 
Chinese regional airliner market, as it demonstrated the opportunity of Brazilian enterprise to 
utilize its unique advantage and become successful in the Chinese market (Zhu, 2019). 
Moreover, the introduction of Chinese private enterprises, especially technology 
companies like Huawei and Tencent, into Brazil, can bring indirect investment, significantly 
helping Brazil’s economic development. As Becard and Macedo argued, compared to the 
Chinese nationally owned monopolies which are more active in the mineral, energy and 
agricultural sectors, the Chinese private enterprises tend to focus on the sectors that are less 
politically sensitive and much closer to Brazil’s consumer market (Becard, Macedo, 2014). 
Such investment can provide more direct social benefits for Brazilian society by satisfying 
the need for consumption of the Brazilian population, as well as engaging technology 
transfers in more diverse economic sectors, such as 5G technology in the telecommunication 
sector. More importantly, Chinese private enterprises are more enthusiastic about industrial 
and technology transfers in order to reduce production costs and increase market efficiency. 
The recent investment of Huawei in its new Brazilian factory is proof of such investment 
(Reuters,2019). By establishing its production and R&D center in Brazil, Huawei is not only 
generating employment and direct investment for Brazil but also helping Brazil move toward 
an industrial upgrade by direct engagement with the production and research of some of the 
most advanced telecom companies. 
 
5. Policy Recommendation and Conclusion 
After evaluating the three policy options above with the established criteria, this research 
concludes that the bilateral trade-upgrade approach is the most viable and efficient approach 
to generate both short and long-term economic benefits for Brazil's economy. Since the 
majority of the private enterprise tends to avoid the politically sensitive sectors, it usually 
creates less political risk for the current administration. At the same time, the private 
enterprise also tends to engage in technology transfers and industrial migration, which can 
generate considerable employment opportunities, direct investment, and government revenue 
to solve the short-term economic challenges Brazil's economy is facing. More importantly, it 
can also help Brazil with its industrial upgrade, which will benefit Brazil’s economy in the 
long run. Finally, by upgrading the trade relationship with China beyond the exporting of 
resources, Brazil can also find new opportunities for its advanced manufacturing sector in the 
growing Chinese market. Based on the reasons above, this study recommends the bilateral 
trade upgrade approach to be adopted. 
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